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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-4-103(j) of the Utah Code 
Annotated. The Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to an 
order dated June 22, 2011 and filed on June 24,2011. (R. 486.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to 
Defendant Johnson on the ground that Defendant Johnson's negligence, which was 
remote as to the time and location of Plaintiff Christopher Dee's injury, was not a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, this Court will "not 
defer to the trial court's conclusions that facts or undisputed nor its legal conclusions 
supported by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Felding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). This Court will "therefore review the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness." Id. (citation omitted). 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 
Defendant Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment was fully briefed by 
Defendant Johnson and was opposed by Plaintiff. (R. 149-151, 152-287, 300-362, and 
363-383.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, ETC, 
Section 78B-5-817, et seq., the "Liability Reform Act." An unannotated copy of 
the Liability Reform Act is included in the Plaintiffs addendum. 
l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is about a car accident in which Plaintiff/Appellant Christopher Dee was 
injured when his car stuck a tow truck operated by Defendant Clinton Kidman, who is not 
a party to this appeal. Approximately 30 minutes prior to the Plaintiffs collision, 
Defendant/Appellee Ricky L. Johnson was traveling eastbound on Interstate 84 near 
Tremonton, Utah. Due to inclement weather, Mr. Johnson lost control of his vehicle and 
slid into the central median near Rattlesnake Pass. No other vehicles were involved. Mr. 
Johnson called the Highway Patrol for assistance. Highway Patrol dispatch called 
Defendant Allred Autobody, LLC, which in turn sent licensed tow truck driver Clinton 
Kidman to the scene. Mr. Kidman pulled Mr. Johnson's vehicle out of the median. The 
Plaintiffs vehicle struck Mr. Kidman's tow truck after Mr. Johnson's vehicle was already 
back on the roadway. 
Plaintiff brought negligence claims against Mr. Johnson, against Allred Autobody, 
and against Mr. Kidman. Mr. Johnson filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that his prior negligence in sliding off the roadway did not proximately cause the 
injuries that the Plaintiff sustained. The trial court granted Mr. Johnson's motion, finding 
that Mr. Johnson's vehicle in the median did not create a dangerous condition that could 
foreseeably result in the Plaintiffs injuries. The dangerous condition that injured the 
Plaintiff was caused by Mr. Kidman's alleged negligence in parking his tow truck so that 
it covered a portion of the left-hand lane of 1-84. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
I. The incident. 
1. In the morning of February 17, 2009, Defendant Ricky L. Johnson was driving his 
1994 Honda Civic eastbound on 1-84 near Tremonton, Utah. (R. 169.) 
2. As Defendant Johnson was driving, it started to snow and the freeway became 
very slick with snow and ice. (R. 169-169a.) 
3. Defendant Johnson lost control of his vehicle in the snow and ice, and it slid off 
the freeway into the median. (R. 171.) 
4. Eastbound 1-84 experiences a slight downward slope in the area where Mr. 
Johnson slid off the road. (R. 170, 342 at 25-26.) 
5. Defendant called the Utah Highway Patrol to request highway assistance. (R. 
171a-172.) 
6. The Utah Highway Patrol contacted Defendant Allred Autobody, a state 
authorized tow truck operator, and requested that the company provide highway 
assistance to Mr. Johnson. (R. 172, 228, 390.) 
7. Defendant Allred Autobody sent Defendant Clinton Kidman to provide assistance 
to Mr. Johnson. (R. 228-229.) 
8. Defendant Kidman arrived at the scene approximately 20 minutes later. (R. 229.) 
9. Once Defendant Kidman arrived on the scene, Mr. Johnson did not direct 
Defendant Kidman, give advice to Defendant Kidman, or control how Defendant Kidman 
went about extricating Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median. (R. 263-264.) 
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10. After his arrival, it took Defendant Kidman at least 10 more minutes to remove 
Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median. (R. 256-257.) 
11. Mr. Johnson and Defendant Kidman were in the process of leaving the scene when 
other cars began sliding off the freeway around them. (R. 240-241.) 
12. Plaintiff Christopher Dee and his girlfriend and passenger, Julie Hunsaker, were 
traveling eastbound on 1-84 at this time. (R. 341 at 20.) 
13. Plaintiff was driving and was "traveling quite fast trying to pass other cars." (R. 
342 at 26.) 
14. Plaintiff "tried to get into the right-hand lane to go through the clearing in the road 
and then when he hit the ice, there was really little control he had over the vehicle and he 
had not slowed significantly at that point to navigate through safely." (R. 342 at 28.) 
15. Plaintiff crashed into the back of Defendant Kidman's tow truck. (R. 196-197, 
343 at 34.) 
16. Plaintiff was seriously injured. (R. 198.) 
17. In a separate case, Plaintiffs passenger Julie Hunsaker brought claims for personal 
injury against the Plaintiff. (R. 340.) 
II. The Trial Court's Ruling 
18. Mr. Johnson moved for summary judgment, arguing that his prior and remote 
negligence could not have been a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. (R. 391.) 
19. The trial court found that Mr. Johnson admitted for the purposes of his motion that 
(a) he owed the Plaintiff a duty of care, (b) he breached his duty, and (c) that the Plaintiff 
suffered damages. (R. 391.) 
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20. The trial court also found that "'but for' Mr. Johnson's negligence in skidding off 
the roadway, Mr. Kidman's tow truck would not have been on the scene." (R. 392.) 
21. The trial court also found, however, that Mr. Johnson's "negligence in skidding 
off the roadway was not the direct cause of the 'dangerous condition' that caused 
Plaintiffs injuries." (R. 391.) 
22. The trial court found that "[t]he cause of the dangerous condition was allegedly 
Mr. Kidman's tow truck being in the roadway." (R. 391.) 
23. The trial court also stated that "it cannot be held that [Mr. Johnson] could foresee 
that a tow truck operator would negligently perform his duties in recovering [Mr. 
Johnson]'s vehicle from the median." (R. 392.) 
24. Finally, the trial court found that "[Mr. Johnson] 's negligence did not directly 
cause Mr. Kidman to allegedly park in the roadway. This was Mr. Kidman's separate 
and subsequent act and independent choice." (R. 392-393.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the trial court's grant of Mr. Johnson's motion for 
summary judgment because Mr. Johnson was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs 
injuries. This case is one of the clearest instances of no negligence. See Dwiggins v. 
Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). While proximate cause is generally an 
issue for the jury, a trial court may rule as a matter of latw on the issue if: (1) there is no 
evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving the cause to jury speculation, or 
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the 
evidence on proximate causation. The trial court in this case was able to rule as a matter 
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of law that Mr. Johnson was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries because 
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the remoteness 
of Mr. Johnson's negligence to the Plaintiffs injuries and the inferences to be derived 
from Defendant Kidman's subsequent actions. 
This is also not a case about superseding cause. The issue in this case is whether 
an actor's remote negligence can be the proximate cause of injuries that are sustained by 
a plaintiff as the result of the negligence of an independent actor. 
In this case, Mr. Johnson lost control of his vehicle and slid into the median on I-
84. As his vehicle sat in the median, Mr. Johnson posed no threat to anyone traveling on 
1-84. Fortunately, no one was injured as the result of Mr. Johnson's negligence. His 
response to the situation was to call the Utah Highway Patrol to request assistance. Once 
he did so, a subsequent chain of events unfolded over which Mr. Johnson had no control. 
Highway Patrol dispatch contacted Allred Autobody and requested that the company 
assist Mr. Johnson. Allred Autobody sent Defendant Kidman to the scene. Defendant 
Kidman arrived at least 20 minutes later. Once Mr. Kidman arrived at the scene, Mr. 
Johnson gave no advice or direction and exerted no control over the manner in which 
Defendant Kidman went about removing Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median. Mr. 
Johnson's negligence caused no harm to anyone. Mr. Johnson's slide off the road was 
not a substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiffs injury. Defendant Kidman's 
negligence in positioning his tow truck on the side of 1-84, on the other hand, is the sole 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. Therefore, the Court can affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment without reaching the issue of superseding cause. 
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Even if the Court reaches the issue of superseding cause, Defendant Kidman's 
subsequent negligence was a superseding cause that wholly relieves Mr. Johnson of 
liability for the Plaintiffs injuries. Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the approach to 
superseding cause that has been adopted by a small minority of jurisdictions in this 
country: that comparative fault makes superseding cause determinations unnecessary. 
Utah has not adopted and should not adopt this narrow approach. 
Plaintiff also urges the Court to adopt the view that the superseding cause defense 
applies only in cases where the subsequent superseding act is intentional. Such a view is 
similarly not supported by Utah case law. Utah courts have consistently held that 
superseding cause is a defense to negligence actions and that mere negligence is 
sufficient for a finding that a subsequent negligent act by a third person supersedes the 
negligence of a prior actor. In order for the superseding cause defense to relieve an actor 
of liability, a court must find that even if the actor's original act was a substantial factor 
in bringing about the harm to the plaintiff, the actor should have realized at the time of 
the original act that a third person might subsequently act negligently. Superseding cause 
also functions to relieve an actor of liability if a reasonable person looking at the events 
in hindsight would not regard the third person's actions as highly extraordinary. 
In this case, Mr. Johnson is relieved of liability because Defendant Kidman's 
subsequent actions were highly extraordinary. The ordinary course of events when a 
stranded motorist calls for roadside assistance is for a tow truck to arrive and to assist the 
stranded motorist safely. Defendant Kidman's negligent performance of his duty in 
pulling Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median produced a result so different from 
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normal that motorists would not dare to call for roadside assistance if what occurred in 
this case were the ordinary effect of calling 9-1-1. In fact, Utah law does not impose 
upon the public a duty not to require highway assistance as the result of negligence. 
Because Defendant Kidman's actions were highly extraordinary, the Court should find 
that those actions were a superseding cause and that Mr. Johnson was, therefore, not a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. The Court should, accordingly, affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Johnson's negligence was so remote to the Plaintiffs injury in time and 
location that reasonable persons could not disagree that Mr. Johnson's 
negligence was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. 
Plaintiff argues in this case that Mr. Johnson's negligence in sliding off the road 
approximately 30 minutes before the Plaintiffs arrival at the scene was a proximate 
cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that summary judgment "shall be rendered if. . . there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). Utah case law indicates that courts should exercise caution in granting a 
motion for summary judgment in a negligence case. "Ordinarily, the question of 
negligence is a question of fact for the jury. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate in 
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 
182, 183 (Utah 1991) (internal quotations omitted). The instant case is one of those 
"clearest instances" because, as explained below, the presence of Defendant Johnson's 
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car in the median approximately 30 minutes before the Plaintiff arrived on the scene was 
not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. 
When considering a motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim, "[i]t is 
only when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn 
therefrom that such issues [of negligence] become questions of law." English v. Kienke, 
11A P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) {quoting Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985)). Such is the case here. 
The undisputed material facts of the instant case show that Defendant Johnson was 
not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. "Proximate cause is that cause which, 
in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause), produced 
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient 
cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." 
Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). As 
shown below, Mr. Johnson's slide into the median could not have, on its own, produced 
the injury to the Plaintiff. The actions that followed Mr. Johnson's slide into the median 
were not the natural and continuous sequence of that event. Therefore, the Court should 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
1. Trial courts can rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause 
in the clearest of instances. 
Plaintiff relies on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Watters v. Querry, 588 
P.2d 702 (Utah 1978), for the proposition that proximate cause is an issue for the jury to 
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decide. Both the procedural facts the substantive facts and in Watters, however, are 
wholly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. 
First, Watters is not a case where the trial court ruled on the issue of proximate 
cause as a matter of law and then was reversed on appeal. A jury trial was held in 
Watters. See id. at 703. The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the trial court 
erroneously excluded evidence and that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on 
the issue of proximate cause. See id. It is, therefore, not a case that draws a line between 
"the clearest instances of no negligence," Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183, and where the 
question of an element of negligence should have been submitted to the jury. Its holding 
is, thus, not wholly on point to the case at bar. 
Watters is also factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Watters, 
defendant Elizabeth Hemingway turned her car north onto 7th 
East Street.. . . She accelerated to the speed of traffic flow.. . 
. After thus proceeding northward about 600 feet to a break 
in the divider, she made a sudden stop to await an opportunity 
to make a left turn. Plaintiff Watters, immediately following 
Hemingway, managed to stop without contact. But the next 
following car . . . ran into the back of plaintiff Watters' car 
resulting in injury to plaintiff and damage to her car. 
Watters, 588 P.2d at 703. The supreme court's analysis in reversing the trial court 
turned on the issue of foreseeability. As cited by the Plaintiff, "[t]he more fundamental 
test is whether under the particular circumstances [the defendant] should have foreseen 
that [her] conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and this 
includes situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of other should reasonably 
be anticipated." Id. at 704. On the facts in Watters, it was foreseeable that Ms. 
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Hemingway's decision to make a sudden stop on a busy road would expose following 
motorists to the risk of harm. It was also foreseeable that a following motorist might fail 
to stop in time so that it collided with a vehicle between that motorist and Ms. 
Hemingway. The results of Ms. Hemingway's decision to negligently stop her vehicle on 
a busy street were immediate in time and occurred in the same place as Ms. 
Hemingway's original act. The results were the natural and continuous sequence of Ms. 
Hemingway's decision to stop suddenly. 
When compared to the facts in the case at bar, it becomes clear why the question 
of proximate cause was submitted to the jury in Watters and why the trial court could 
properly determine the question of proximate cause as a matter of law in the case at bar. 
In the case at bar, it was foreseeable that Mr. Johnson's slide off the road might cause 
harm to other motorists in the median. However, it was not foreseeable that Mr. 
Johnson's slide into the median would cause harm to motorists, like the Plaintiff, who 
remained on the roadway. It was only when Defendant Kidman made the decision to 
extricate Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median on the eastbound side of the interstate at 
the bottom of a slippery hill that the conditions arose that ultimately caused harm to the 
Plaintiff. "While proximate cause is generally an issue for the jury, a trial court may rule 
as a matter of law on the issue if: \\) there is no evidence to establish a causal 
connection, thus leaving the cause to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons 
could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate 
causation.'" Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676 {quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)). In 
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the case at bar, reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from 
the evidence before the Court: first, Mr. Johnson's original act was remote in time to the 
Plaintiffs injuries, which occurred approximately 30 minutes after Mr. Johnson slid into 
the median. Second, the presence of Mr. Johnson's car in the median did not, in itself, 
create a dangerous condition on the roadway where the Plaintiff was traveling and where 
the Plaintiff was injured. Third, Mr. Johnson took no part in determining how his vehicle 
should be removed from the median. Fourth, Utah Highway Patrol dispatch, Allred 
Autobody, and Defendant Kidman all took actions over which Mr. Johnson had no 
control, actions that ultimately created the condition by which the Plaintiff was injured. 
Finally, and most importantly, it was unforeseeable to Mr. Johnson that calling 9-1-1 for 
assistance would result in injury to the Plaintiff up on the roadway. Because reasonable 
minds could not differ regarding the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in this 
case, it is clear that Mr. Johnson's slide into the median was not a proximate cause of the 
Plaintiffs injuries. Therefore, the Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on that issue. 
2. The other Utah cases cited by the Plaintiff support the position that 
Mr. Johnson was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. 
To support his theory that Mr. Johnson proximately caused the Plaintiffs injuries, 
the Plaintiff cites other Utah cases. Each of these Utah cases, like Watters, however, is 
distinguishable from the case at bar. 
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a. Jensen v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 
1980) 
The second case cited by the Plaintiff is Jensen v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). In Jensen, the plaintiff was injured when a defendant named 
Gonzalez executed a left-hand turn around a Mountain Bell construction site that was in 
the middle of an intersection. See id. at 364. "Plaintiff brought suit against Mountain 
Bell and Gonzales alleging that each was negligent and the negligence of each was a 
proximate cause of his injuries." Id. Mountain Bell argued that the subsequent 
negligence of Gonzales "constituted an independent intervening cause which cut off the 
negligence of Mountain Bell and made the negligence of Gonzales the sole proximate 
cause of plaintiff s injuries." Id. at 364-365. The trial court granted Mountain Bell's 
motion for summary judgment and the Utah Supreme Court reversed. See id. at 366. 
The court held that "the evidence before the District Court was not such that it could be 
said that reasonable minds could not differ that [Gonzales'] conduct was not foreseeable 
by Mountain Bell." Id. 
Of key importance to Jensen was the proximity of the harm to the acts performed 
by each defendant. The plaintiff was injured in the intersection while Mountain Bell's 
construction partially blocked the intersection. Gonzales executed his left-hand turn 
around the Mountain Bell construction and hit the plaintiff. The result of Mountain 
Bell's blocking the intersection was immediate in time and location to the harm suffered 
by the plaintiff and was, thus, foreseeable. Mountain Bell's actions were "[a] risk created 
by the defendant [that] include[d] the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others 
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. . . the standard of reasonable care may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff 
against 'that occasion(al) negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life 
and therefore to be anticipated.'" Id. (quoting Watters, 588 P.2d 702, 704 (Utah 1978)). 
A person causing an accident while attempting to make a left-hand turn around a 
construction site that partially blocks an intersection was "that occasional negligence 
which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated." Id. 
When compared to the case at bar, it is clear that Mountain Bell's acts were close 
in time and location to the plaintiffs injury compared to Mr. Johnson's acts in the instant 
case. As stated before, the Plaintiffs injuries in the instant case were neither proximate 
in time nor proximate in location to Mr. Johnson's slide from the roadway. Mr. Johnson 
was in the median and posed no threat to motorists traveling on the roadway. Plaintiff 
was injured on the roadway approximately 30 minutes after Mr. Johnson slid into the 
intersection. Defendant Kidman's highly extraordinary act in extricating a vehicle from 
the median at the bottom of a slippery hill on a stormy day was not the foreseeable result 
of Mr. Johnson's decision to call the Utah Highway Patrol for help. Indeed, Utah law 
does not impose upon the public "a duty not to require, as the result of negligence, 
highway assistance." Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, f 28, 131 P.3d 280, ajf'd, 
171 P.3d 411. The trial court went on to find that "the circumstances in this case are the 
equivalent of the plaintiff in Jensen suing the person who had called defendant (Mountain 
Bell) for service. Therefore, the Court finds that [Mr. Johnson] 's negligence cannot 
reasonably be held to have been a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries." (R. 393.) 
Because Defendant Kidman's actions were not the foreseeable result of Mr. Johnson's 
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slide into the intersection, Mr. Johnson's slide into the intersection was not a proximate 
cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. Therefore, the Court should affirm the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment on that issue. 
b. Harris v. U.T.A., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) 
The third Utah case that Plaintiff cites is Harris v. U.T.A., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 
1983). Like Walters and Jensen, Harris is distinguishable. In Harris, the first defendant 
was driving a bus and parked it on the side of the road, but a portion of the bus was 
obstructing part of the travel lane. See Harris, 671 P.2d at 218. The plaintiff was a 
passenger in the second defendant's Jeep. See id. The second defendant came upon the 
bus and swerved to avoid hitting it. See id. However, the right side of the Jeep hit the 
left rear side of the bus, which caused injuries to the plaintiff. See id. at 218-219. The 
appellate court held that 
the issue of [the second defendant's] negligence and 
proximate cause should have gone to the jury. If, as plaintiff 
contends, [the first defendant] stopped the bus too rapidly, or 
failed to drive out of the lane of traffic, or had faulty brake 
lights, he may have contributed to a rear-end collision by a 
momentarily inattentive driver, which would not have been so 
'extraordinary' as to be unforeseeable. 
Id. at 220. In Harris, the actions of both defendants were both close in time and close in 
physical proximity to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in that case. The Plaintiffs 
injuries in the instant case by way of comparison, are much more remote in time and 
physical proximity to Mr. Johnson's actions, just as they were in Watters and in Jensen. 
Plaintiff attempts to apply Harris to the case at bar by shoehorning the roles of 
each of the actors in the instant case into the fact pattern presented in Harris. According 
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to the Plaintiffs reading, Mr. Johnson would be the Harris bus driver, Defendant Kidman 
would be the driver of the Jeep, and the Plaintiff would be the passenger in the Jeep. This 
application of the facts in Harris to the instant case is misplaced, however. Comparing 
the role of each actor in the instant case to the facts in Harris would require the insertion 
of a hypothetical actor into the Harris fact pattern. If there were a person in Harris who, 
30 minutes before the Jeep driver's arrival at the scene, slipped on some ice and lost 
control of his vehicle, leaving the vehicle off the road and away from the travel surface 
then the facts of the instant case could be applied directly to the facts in Harris. This 
comparison could only take place if the hypothetical actor, after losing control of his 
vehicle, then hailed a bus in order to make it home. The hypothetical actor could not, 
however, control any aspect of how the bus driver pulled to the side of the road in order 
to pick the hypothetical actor up. If those were the facts in Harris then they would 
exactly match the facts in the instant case. Mr. Johnson would fit perfectly into the role 
of the hypothetical actor who hailed the bus for a ride home. Defendant Kidman would 
fit perfectly into the role of the bus driver who, without taking any direction or advice 
from the hypothetical actor hailing the bus, pulled over and left part of the rear of his bus 
in the lane of travel on the roadway. The Plaintiff would fit perfectly into the role of the 
second Harris defendant who was driving the Jeep. The Plaintiffs passenger, Julie 
Hunsaker, would fit perfectly into the role of the injured Harris plaintiff. 
The most obvious conclusion when comparing the facts of the two cases in this 
way is that no reasonable jury could find that the hypothetical actor who hailed the bus in 
Harris proximately caused the injuries of the injured Harris passenger. The person who 
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hailed the bus in Harris is not present in the fact pattern of that case because it is obvious 
that an injury to the Jeep passenger was not the foreseeable result of hailing a bus—even 
if the person who hailed the bus negligently slid off the road approximately 30 minutes 
before the Jeep's arrival on the scene. Just as the court in Harris would have been able to 
find, as a matter of law, that the person who hailed the bus was not the proximate cause 
of the Jeep passenger's injuries, the trial court in the instant case found that Mr. 
Johnson—who called the Utah Highway Patrol, which then sent a tow truck—was not a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. The Court can reach the same conclusion. 
Indeed, "reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the 
evidence on proximate causation." Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citation omitted). Therefore, the Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
3. None of the cases cited by the Plaintiff stand for the proposition that 
the issue of proximate cause can never be decided as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff argues that he should withstand summary judgment because the questions 
of proximate cause and foreseeability should always be submitted to the jury. The three 
Utah cases cited by the Plaintiff do not, however, stand for such a broad proposition. In 
fact, each of them explicitly states that proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law 
in the right circumstances. This case presents those circumstances because it is one of the 
clearest instances of no negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed ruling on proximate cause as a matter of law in 
the subsequent Waiters case, Waiters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981). After the 
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jury decided for a second time that Ms. Hemingway was not a proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiff appealed on the theory that the trial court should have 
decided as a matter of law that Ms. Hemingway was a proximate cause. See id. at 457. 
The appellate court held that "[ojrdinarily, the issue of proximate cause is a matter to be 
submitted to the jury for its determination. . . . The issue of proximate cause was 
properly submitted to the jury." Id. at 457-458. Nothing in that language disturbs 
subsequent pronouncements by Utah courts that "a trial court may rule as a matter of law 
on [proximate cause]," Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation 
omitted). As stated above, the conditions for a proper finding on the issue of proximate 
cause as a matter of law is met in this case. 
In Jensen, the court stated, "We recognize at the outset that in appropriate 
circumstances summary judgment may be granted on the issue proximate cause." Jensen, 
611 P.2d at 365. It found that "in a situation involving independent intervening cause, 
the primary issue is one of the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent conduct of a 
third person, and in this case, that issue must be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. 
(emphasis added). Proximate cause was a jury question in Jensen. Where Mr. Johnson 
would have stood in the shoes of the person who requested Mountain Bell's service in 
Jensen, however, the question of proximate cause is not a jury question. 
Similarly in Harris, the court stated that "[w]e do not mean to imply that rulings 
by the court which decide a factual contention as a matter of law are never appropriate." 
Harris, 671 P.2d at 220. Indeed, Utah case law makes it clear that "summary judgment is 
appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 
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183 (internal quotations omitted). This case is one of the clearest instances of no 
negligence and, therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper. The 
Court should, accordingly, affirm the trial court's ruling. Furthermore, the Court is able 
to do so without reaching the issue of superseding cause. 
4. The Plaintiffs conclusions that, Plaintiff argues, require that the issue 
of proximate cause should be submitted to the jury are either 
erroneous or rely on facts that are immaterial. 
Plaintiff makes eight arguments for facts "on which a reasonable jury could find in 
favor of Plaintiff on [the] issue [of proximate cause]." (PL's Br. 14-15.) But all of those 
facts are either immaterial or reach faulty conclusions. 
(a) First, "Defendant Johnson is the one who called for assistance and knew that 
he needed a tow truck to pull his car out of the median." (PL's Br. 14.) This fact does 
not create a causal connection between Mr. Johnson's presence on the scene and the 
Plaintiffs injuries. The Utah Highway Patrol sent the tow truck and Defendant Kidman 
made all the decisions regarding the manner in which he pulled Mr. Johnson's car from 
the median. 
(b) "Second, as Defendant Johnson was waiting for the tow truck, he admitted that 
he was worried that other cars would lose control in the area and hit him." (PL's Br. 14.) 
Just because Mr. Johnson was, justifiably, worried that other motorists might slide off of 
the icy road, it does not mean that Mr. Johnson was a proximate cause in this case. His 
presence in the median had no effect on road conditions. Indeed, it was the weather, not 
Mr. Johnson, created the slick conditions on the roadway that caused the other vehicles to 
slide subsequently slide off the roadway. 
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(c) "Third, the crash happened only 30 minutes after [Mr. Johnson] lost control 
and slid into the median, which is a much shorter time than the Florida Court of Appeals 
considered in Cooke [v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 So.3d 1192 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2009)." (PL's Br. 14.) This fact is irrelevant because Cooke is distinguishable. In that 
case, "the record show[ed] that as the result of the first accident, southbound traffic on 
Interstate 75 had slowed and backed up to the crest of a hill north of the scene of the first 
accident." Id. at 1193. In regard to cases like Cooke and others like it cited by the 
Plaintiff, the trial court found "that the cases cited by the Plaintiff are distinguishable 
from the circumstances present in this case. Specifically, the cases cited by the Plaintiff 
have one thing in common: the defendants' vehicles were the 'dangerous condition' on 
the roadway at the time the plaintiffs suffered their injuries and until this 'dangerous 
condition' was gone it was foreseeable that a plaintiff might sustain injuries." (R. 392.) 
The first accident in Cooke created a dangerous condition on the roadway. Mr. Johnson's 
slide into the median, on the other hand, did not. The trial court went on to say that "in 
this matter it cannot be reasonably held that [Mr. Johnson]'s vehicle, by being in the 
median, was the 'dangerous condition.'" (R. 392.) 
(d) "Fourth, while Defendant Johnson and Defendant Kidman were back on the 
freeway, they decided that they needed to move their vehicles because people were going 
to get hurt, which means that both recognized the hazardous situation." (PL's Br. 14.) 
The hazardous conditions that existed at that point were not caused by Mr. Johnson. He 
did not create the icy conditions on the road. He did not choose the location or control 
the means by which Mr. Kidman extricated his vehicle from the median. 
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(e) "Fifth, several other vehicles had slid off the freeway before Plaintiff arrived at 
the scene. So, the area where the accident happened was objectively hazardous." This 
argument, taken within the context of Plaintiff s other arguments, seems to imply that Mr. 
Johnson caused all of these other vehicles to slide off the freeway and that Mr. Johnson 
caused the area to be objectively hazardous. There is no evidence on the record to 
support this proposition. It would be improper to attribute fault to Mr. Johnson simply 
because the road was icy. The weather conditions more than account for the hazardous 
conditions that persisted in the area. 
(f) "Sixth, Defendant Johnson's car was still hooked up to the tow truck when 
Plaintiff hit it. Thus, the dangerous situation created by Defendant Johnson's actions was 
still ongoing at the time of the collision." (PL's Br. 14.) Even if it is true that Mr. 
Johnson's truck was still attached to Defendant Kidman's tow truck, it is irrelevant 
because, by the time the collision occurred, Mr. Johnson's presence on the side of the 
road was wholly the result of Mr. Kidman's decisions in operating the tow truck. 
(g) "Seventh, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant Kidman did 
anything unusual or out of the ordinary while he was removing Defendant Johnson's 
car." (PL's Br. 14.) This statement must be considered from the perspective of the 
reasonable person viewing Mr. Kidman's actions as they are happening. See Jensen, 611 
P.2dat365. 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent 
in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a 
superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's 
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if: 
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(b) A reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the 
act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly 
extraordinary that the third person had so acted. 
Id, {citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 (1965)). Defendant Kidman chose to pull 
Mr. Johnson's vehicle out of the median at the bottom of an icy hill on the side of a 
interstate with a high speed limit during a storm. The reasonable person in that situation 
could have taken a number of actions to ensure the safety of himself, Mr. Johnson, and 
any people traveling on the road. The reasonable person could have used the other side 
of the freeway to extricate the vehicle. The reasonable person could have driven Mr. 
Johnson from the scene and returned for the vehicle later when the weather was better. 
Defendant Kidman's actions were highly extraordinary considering the weather, the icy 
road, his location at the bottom of a hill, and the speed of traffic on an interstate highway. 
It is even more extraordinary that Defendant Kidman blocked a portion of the roadway in 
performing his work. Indeed, the record is full of examples of highly extraordinary 
actions on the part of Defendant Kidman given the circumstances. 
(h) "Lastly, it is undisputed that, but for Defendant Johnson's negligence, 
Defendant Kidman's tow truck would not have been on the side of the freeway." (PL's 
Br. 14.) Plaintiff misapplies the test for but-for causation with this argument. Black's 
Law Dictionary defines "but-for cause" as "[t]he cause without which the event could not 
have occurred." Black's Law Dictionary? 212 (7th ed. 1999). Plaintiff s argument ignores 
that the Utah Highway Patrol and Allred Autobody sent Defendant Kidman and his tow 
truck to the scene and that Mr. Johnson did not control or contribute to the way that 
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Defendant Kidman operated his truck. A more accurate statement would read, "But for 
Defendant's negligence and but for the Utah Highway Patrol directing Allred Autobody 
to send a tow truck to the scene, and but for Allred Autobody directing Defendant 
Kidman to go to the scene, and but for Defendant Kidman's unilateral decisions in 
pulling Mr. Johnson out of the median, then Defendant Kidman's tow truck would not 
have been there at the time of the collision." It is the intervention of these additional 
actors, without even taking into consideration the extant icy road conditions and the 
Plaintiffs driving "quite fast trying to pass other cars," (R. 342 at 26.) that created the 
circumstances under which no reasonable jury would find that Mr. Johnson was a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. Once Mr. Johnson's vehicle slid into the 
median, he posed no threat to any person on the roadway in either direction. Any of the 
events that took place after he called 9-1-1 were wholly out of his control. For these 
reasons, Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of fact upon which a reasonable jury could 
find that Mr. Johnson's actions were a proximate cause of his injuries. Therefore, the 
Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
B. Even if the Court elects to reach the issue of superseding cause, the Court will 
find that Defendant Kidman's actions were a superseding cause that relieves 
Mr. Johnson of any liability for the Plaintiffs injuries. 
Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant Kidman was not a superseding cause in 
this action. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the Court should rule that superseding cause 
should be done away as an affirmative defense in negligence cases. This argument 
ignores Utah case law that positively cites superseding cause as a defense to negligence. 
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Defendant Kidman was a superseding cause that cuts off the effects of Mr. Johnson's 
negligence. 
1. Under the test adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., Defendant Kidman's subsequent acts 
were a superseding cause, 
The Supreme Court of Utah adopted section 447 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts on the issue of superseding cause. See Jensen, 611 P.2d at 365. A portion of that 
test is stated and applied to this case in Section A(4)(g), supra. The first portion of that 
test also applies in this case to relieve Mr. Johnson of liability for Plaintiffs injuries 
because applying the test to this case shows that Defendant Kidman's actions were a 
superseding cause: 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent 
in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a 
superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's 
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if: 
(a) The actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have 
realized that a third person might so act, or . . . 
Jensen, 611 P.2d at 365 {quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 (1965)). 
According to this test, Defendant Kidman's actions are not a superseding cause if, at the 
time that Mr. Johnson slid off the freeway, Mr. Johnson should have realized that a tow 
truck driver might negligently remove his car from the median. Reasonable minds cannot 
differ on this point: at the time that Mr. Johnson called 9-1-1, he could not have foreseen 
that a tow truck driver would cause an accident on the roadway that Mr. Johnson's car 
was no longer sitting on. Therefore, Defendant Kidman's actions were a superseding 
24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cause and relieve Mr. Johnson of liability for the Plaintiffs injuries. As such, the Court 
should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Johnson. 
2. Utah case law clearly shows that superseding cause is still an 
affirmative defense in negligence actions. 
This Court recently stated in Gardner v. SPXCorp., 2012 UT App 45, that 
superseding cause is a recognized affirmative defense in negligence cases. Though it did 
not reach the issue, the Court stated that "[t]o begin with, we are skeptical of Gardner's 
claim that the comparative negligence statute supplanted the doctrine of superseding 
cause. Notwithstanding the enactment of the comparative negligence statute in 1986, 
Utah courts routinely refer to and apply the doctrine in negligence cases." Id. at *[[ 35. 
The Court then went on to cite four cases subsequent to the passage of the Liability 
Reform Act in which the doctrine of superseding cause was relied upon by the court in 
some fashion. The doctrine applies in Utah cases and the Court, if it reaches the issue, 
should hold that it applies here. 
Plaintiff also cites Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
for the proposition that superseding cause only applies to cases where the subsequent 
conduct is intentional in nature. In Bansasine, a decedent's heir filed suit against the 
driver of the motor vehicle that the decedent was riding in after the decedent was shot by 
another motorist when the defendant drove his vehicle in such a way that the gunman 
became angry. See id. The appellate court found as a matter of law, that, 
a reasonable juror could not have found that defendant's 
driving was the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiffs 
father. We agree that a reasonable juror could not find that 
the defendant should foresee that another driver on the road 
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would fire a gun into his car simply because he shined his 
high beams on that person, passed him, then sped up as the 
driver tried to approach. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court positively cited a test from the Restatement of 
Torts in which intentional acts are analyzed. That positive citation, however, in no way 
limits the application of the doctrine of superseding cause to cases where the subsequent 
act is intentional. Therefore, the doctrine of superseding cause applies to this case and 
the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that the Court enter an 
order affirming the trial court's ruling. 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Rule 24(f)(1)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It contains 7513 words, excluding the portions 
exempted by Rule 24(f)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This brief complies with the typeface requirements set forth in Rule 27(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, 
13-point Times New Roman, using Microsoft Office Word 97 - 2003. 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitted this J day of March, 2012. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
TERR f^ M. PLANT 
JOSHUA T. GARDNER 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Ricky L. Johnson 
ADDENDUM 
Mr. Johnson relies upon and adopts the Plaintiffs addendum. 
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